SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION
FDR AND OBAMA: ARE THERE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
LESSONS FROM THE NEW DEAL FOR THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION?
Craig L. Jackson
It was the popular media that first made the comparison between
an Obama presidency and that of Franklin Roosevelt. The media did
not wait until President Obama took office, but began the comparisons in earnest after the presidential election of 2008, perhaps most
famously on Time Magazine’s November 24, 2008 cover depicting a
photoshopped Barack Obama in a characteristic pose of the New
Deal President along with an article titled “the New New Deal.” Most
of the comparisons had to do with the fallout from the economic
near collapse of September 2008 amid reports of the second Great
Depression and the expectation at that time of a legislative agenda
suited for the present times, as the New Deal has been historically
1
portrayed was for its times. And though FDR presided over a period
of upheaval in national economics, his presidency also set the stage
for a period of profound change in constitutional interpretation leading to a revolution in regulatory development which redefined the
role of the state in American life. This period was made all the more
dramatic by the related conflicts between the Presidency, the Supreme Court, and the Congress. The media may have had less of the
latter on their minds when these comparisons were made, but as the
Obama Administration progressed, it became apparent to constitutional scholars that the regulatory developments in the areas of
health care reform and financial regulation were creating some in1

See Paul Krugman, Franklin Delano Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2008, at A29 (arguing that
to achieve a success similar to the one enjoyed by the New Deal, President Obama needed
to adopt a bold economic policy); Mark Green, 7 Days: FDR = Obama? Alter, Huffington,
vanden Heuvel & Green Discuss and Compare Their Transitions, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 15,
2008, 11:28 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-green/7-days-fdr-obama-alterhu_b_144058.html (discussing the respective transition strategies of Obama and Roosevelt); George Packer, The New Liberalism: How the economic crisis can help Obama redefine the
Democrats, NEW YORKER, Nov. 17, 2008, available at http://www.newyorker.com/
reporting/2008/11/17/081117fa_fact_packer (arguing that times of economic crisis can
allow Presidents to makeover their political parties and agendas).
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teresting substantive interactions between the two periods, which in
turn resulted in new interest in examining the constitutional developments of the New Deal era.
The regulatory state as we know it began during the New Deal and
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is one of the most
significant regulatory programs passed by Congress since the New
Deal. As a result of these obvious connections, and the constitutional
theory underlying them, several scholars were invited to consider the
two periods and comment on what they considered to be noteworthy
constitutional developments connecting the administrations. This
symposium edition is the product of a conference of the same name,
which was held at the University of Pennsylvania Law School in January of 2012. That event was preceded by a single panel presentation
addressing the same issues at the Annual Meeting of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools (“SEALS”) in the summer of 2011.
This core panel, which was the basis for the larger symposium at the
University of Pennsylvania, produced the scholarship presented in
2
this edition.
A tacit recognition of the doctrinal legacy of the New Deal on present day constitutional doctrine is evident in this scholarship, as each
article engages the New Deal period in some way as part of the backdrop for larger points of discussion. The New Deal, Franklin Roosevelt and the Democratic Congress’s legislative response to the Great
Depression convened a period whose richness as a source of discussion, argument, and analysis for constitutional law scholars has to do
with the fact that several doctrinal strands came together during the
period and underwent profound changes. Most notable of these
were the jurisprudence of the Commerce and the Due Process Clauses, and the federalism and separation of powers doctrines intertwined
with these areas. Frustrated with a court holding to principles of interpretation thought to undermine New Deal legislation, President
Roosevelt sought to add up to six new Justices to the Supreme Court
for every justice over seventy in hopes of getting a Court more ideologically attuned to his agenda. Failing that, Roosevelt went on to
appoint eight Justices to the Court in his second and third terms, ef2

This is true with two exceptions. This writer’s paper, The Limiting Principle Strategy and
Challenges to the New Deal Commerce Clause, was not delivered at the SEALS meeting or the
University of Pennsylvania Law School symposium and is being presented for the first
time in this edition. An article titled 1937 Redux? Reflections On Constitutional Development
And Political Structures by Professor Mark Tushnet, a member of the core panel at SEALS
and the University of Pennsylvania Law School was published in Volume 14 of this Journal. See Mark Tushnet, 1937 Redux? Reflections On Constitutional Development And Political
Structures, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1103 (2012).
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fectively achieving the result that he sought through the ill-fated
Court Packing Plan. That result was a court willing to entertain
broader understandings of key constitutional provisions, as well as the
doctrines of federalism and separation of powers (key to the New
Deal), and with that, set in motion the development the beginnings
of the modern regulatory state.
This writer’s article, The Limiting Principle Strategy and Challenges to
the New Deal Commerce Clause, focuses on how the Court has defined
Congressional power through the Commerce Clause. The Supreme
Court, beginning in 1937, has interpreted the Clause as a powerful
and plenary power of Congress when rationally used and has deferred to Congress on matters of federalism. However since United
3
States v. Lopez, the Court has sought to limit this power, and its
Commerce Clause decisions have been weakest when the Court subjectively develops limiting principles on Congressional authority
without solid constitutional bases. Broad and vague constitutional
provisions such as the Tenth Amendment describe a policy but do
not provide adequate specifics to justify the non-political branch imposing its conceptions of federalism on the legislature. The econom4
ic activities principle in Lopez and United States v. Morrison is such an
example. The activities/non-activities dichotomy in National Federation ruling that the Commerce Clause did not authorize Congressional passage of the Individual Mandate is another such example of a
subjective limiting principle.
The present Court’s dilemma is that in seeking to arrest the expansive nature of the New Deal Commerce Clause, it is limited in the
means to pursue limiting principles. The old conservative Court had
the specific language of the Commerce Clause—“among the several
states”—to limit Congress’s power, and when it went beyond that to
allow implementation beyond the specifics of the clause via the Necessary and Proper Clause, it limited Congress to channels and instrumentalities of commerce. Decisions in 1937 and after expanded
Congress’s authority much further by use of the Substantial Effects
Doctrine and aggregation theory making Congress’s commercial authority a general economic regulatory authority. In doing so, the decisions opened the door to the creation of the modern regulatory
state with influence in economic and social policy to the extent the
national economy was affected. To return to the old conservative
ways would mean rewriting the six decades of Court precedent prior
3
4
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to Lopez. Instead of such a drastic move, the present day court majority chooses to impose its own view of the proper role of Congress vis-àvis the states over the judgment of Congress, and it has done so with
subjective approaches to the federalism principles. National Federation’s Commerce Clause ruling is the latest example.
Professor Laura Cisneros is an associate professor of law at the
Golden Gate University School of Law in San Francisco. In her article Transformative Properties of FDR’s Court-Packing Plan and the Significance of Symbol, Professor Cisneros takes the single most dramatic political and legal moment in the New Deal era, Roosevelt’s Court
Packing Plan, and examines how it has been used rhetorically in federal court decisions since then. She notes that Dean Erwin
Chermerinsky has argued that fuller understanding of Supreme
Court decisions can be achieved by examining how the justices of the
5
Supreme Court and judges on lower courts use rhetoric. With this in
mind, Professor Cisneros identifies two kinds of messages in the use
of the Court Packing Plan in decisions.
Some references in federal cases have invoked the Court Packing
Plan to warn of incursions into judicial independence. Others have
used the Plan to caution against judicial policy-making. Both references, worded differently to reflect the writer’s intent, demonstrate
the “transformative power” of the event.
Professor Cisneros continues in her essay to review the uses of the
language “switch in time”—the reference to the legend of Justice
Robert’s “change” of judicial philosophy following the announcement of the Court Packing Plan. She also reviews decisions where
both references were used together. Professor Cisneros says that the
language of the Court Packing Plan as a rhetorical tool “has entered
our culture of argument” over the role of the Courts in our govern6
mental system.
Professor Charlton Copeland is an associate professor of law at the
University of Miami School of Law. His article Beyond Separation in
Federalism Enforcement: Medicaid Expansion, Coercion, and the Norm of
Engagement, is an examination of an alternative way of looking at federalism issues through the lens of the Court’s decision in National Federation7 on the Medicaid expansion provision of the Affordable Care
Act. Professor Copeland argues that the dominant paradigm for ex5
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Laura A. Cisneros, Transformative Properties of FDR’s Court-Packing Plan and the Significance of
Symbol, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 61, 63 n.12 (2012) (referencing Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2008, 2008 (2002)).
Id. at 90.
National Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) [hereinafter NFIB].
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amining federalism enforcement focuses primarily on the separation
of authority between states and the federal government at the time of
legislative enactment. This approach ignores how implementation of
legislative policy at both national and state levels involves cooperative
federalism in cases involving federal Spending Clause legislation.
Professor Copeland maintains that the decision of a majority of
the Court invalidating part of the Medicaid expansion provision, on
the basis that the provision amounted to coercion, was an opportunity missed. He argues that the better way to evaluate federalism issues
is to focus on how administrative law principles protect state interests
and their role in implementation of legislative policy. The coercion
theory, rooted in Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, is an example of
a truncated approach to federalism. Professor Copeland gives other
examples of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, demonstrating that
case law’s reliance on separation as the exclusive mode of analysis.
Professor Copeland’s discussion of the Medicaid program shows how
actual administrative implementation of the program conflicts with
the separation approach to federalism enforcement, and how that
long established practice in Medicaid implementation could have influenced the Court in its analysis of the expansion. Professor
Copeland gives examples of other state-federal programs from the
implementation point of view, suggesting that administrative law doctrine offers a more realistic means of evaluating the state-federal relationship.
Professor Barry Cushman is the John P. Murphy Foundation Professor of Law at the University of Notre Dame. Professor Cushman’s
article is an extensive review of the book Supreme Power: Franklin Roosevelt vs. the Supreme Court8 by Jeff Shesol. Shesol’s book has been regarded as not only a description of the politics and law of the three
branches of government surrounding Roosevelt’s Court Packing
Plan, but also as a subtle suggestion of similarities between Roosevelt’s times and the present with hotly contested regulatory develop9
ments and a divided Supreme Court at both ends of the timeline.
Professor Cushman’s article examines Shesol’s book from three perspectives: (1) Shesol’s treatment of the political story of the Court
Packing Plan, (2) that episode’s legal story, and (3) how the two stories relate to each other. Professor Cushman concludes that the book
8
9

JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT (2010).
Casey Greenfield, FDR’s Court Shenanigans, THE DAILY BEAST (Apr. 13, 2010, 7:42 PM)
available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/04/13/fdrs-court-shenanigans.
html (noting parallels between Roosevelt’s difficulty in enacting New Deal programs and
Obama’s attempts to pass healthcare reform).
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is far more successful in addressing the political story than it is in addressing the remaining two perspectives.
Professor Cushman describes the political story as “how to understand the political trajectory of the Plan from its initial conceptualiza10
tion to its ultimate failure” and he credits Shesol’s “skillful render11
ing of the political story” as supporting the view the Plan was
mishandled from the beginning at the announcement of the plan—
so much so that “[i]t was not unreasonable for the justices to doubt
that their immediate, total, and unconditional surrender was neces12
sary in order to avert the threat of Court–packing.”
However, the article does not regard the book as being nearly as
successful in its rendering of the legal story in large part because of
inconsistent reflection on what Professor Cushman calls the internal
story—how factors having to do with quality of constitutional argument, legislation, doctrinal developments over time, and the appointments process affected the posture of the Court both before
13
and after the announcement of the Court Packing plan. Though he
acknowledges that the book lays some groundwork validating an internal perspective—Professor Cushman faults Shesol’s willingness to
resort to the factors external to legal craftsmanship—personalities of
the Justices, the threat of the Court Packing Plan, and the magnitude
of Roosevelt’s 1936 landslide victory—to describe the legal story. Professor Cushman argues that in the book’s perspective, “being a liberal
or a conservative justice boiled down to selecting between two competing theories of political economy in the service of two competing
14
sets of interests”—laissez-faire economics and the welfare state. Professor Cushman believes that resort to this paradigm in Shesol’s telling of the legal story, as well as the relationship between the legal and
political stories, dilutes and negates much of Shesol’s recognition of
the internal dimension to the developing interpretive process going
15
on at the Court.
Professor Jamal Greene of Columbia Law School analyzes the litigation strategy in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,
16
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act case. Justifications
for the Act’s Individual Mandate were based primarily on the authori-
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Barry Cushman, The Man on the Flying Trapeze, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 184 (2012).
Id. at 209.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 205–07, 214–15.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 208.
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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ty of Congress to regulate interstate commerce under Article I of the
17
Constitution, an argument based in large part on New Deal era
precedents that expanded the reach of Congress’s power under that
clause. Professor Greene establishes in his article, What the New Deal
Settled, that the strategy to attack Congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to pass the individual mandate is not demonstrably
stronger than a strategy based on substantive due process—a strategy
that was not pursued by the Act’s opponents. Though the basis for
legislative authority under both the Commerce and Due Process
Clauses were expanded by New Deal era precedents, the opponents
to the law, and to the individual mandate in particular, were willing
to challenge the constitutionality of the law under the former but not
the latter. Professor Greene offers several critical assessments on this
litigation strategy.
Acknowledging the political component of the debate and litigation over the health care law, Professor Greene suggests three reasons
for this strategy. First, arguments based on due process would have
drawn into question the constitutionality of the similar Massachusetts
state level health care legislation signed into law by the Republican
presidential candidate Mitt Romney when he was governor of that
state. In addition, that strategy, with its foundation in the liberty interest component of due process theory, would have weakened the
fragile coalition between libertarians and social conservatives in the
Republican Party. Finally, Professor Greene suggests a reluctance on
the part of the mandate to “affiliate their arguments with the Court’s
reproductive freedom precedents” which would be practically una18
voidable.
Professor Greene also argues that the absence of due process arguments shows just how pervasive the aversion to the economic due
process legacy of the Lochner decision is on constitutional thinking.
Substantive due process arguments in economic cases can be distinguished from Lochner–style economic due process by articulating constitutional principles based upon accepted rationales. Yet Lochner’s
disproportionate impact on constitutional theory stymies these arguments.
Within the scenarios played out during this period of constitutional interpretive change was the principle of separation of powers.
This produced an understanding between the Court and Congress on

17
18

See Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 17–20, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398).
Jamal Greene, What the New Deal Settled, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 265, 267 (2012).
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the role of deference by the Court to Congress based upon a presumption of constitutionality that the Court would accord legislation
before it if the legislation were shown to be a rational exercise of
Congressional authority. Professor Louise Weinberg, the holder of
the Bates Chair at the University of Texas School of Law, reminds us
in her article, Unlikely Beginnings of Modern Constitutional Thought, that
part of this settlement, outlined in United States v. Carolene Products
19
Co. between the two branches, did not include legislation affecting
constitutional rights. Footnote four in that decision separated constitutional rights from the new deferential settlement by establishing a
rights-based tiered scrutiny approach based on interest analysis, instead. And though Carolene Products is celebrated as being the source
of rights-based jurisprudence, Professor Weinberg demonstrates a
heretofore unrecognized jurisprudential heritage of the concept occurring in Court decisions earlier in the decade, most notably in the
conflicts of laws area. Professor Weinberg describes Carolene Products’
Footnote Four not only as “the beginning of the end of pre-modern
constitutional thought” in the area of rights-based constitutional
analysis, but in light of the earlier case precedent, “also the end of the
20
beginnings.”
The principle that government must have at least a legitimate
purpose to enforce its legislation is first observed in a 1930 conflict of
laws case establishing that state legislation applies only to those transactions with which the state had significant contacts creating state in21
terests. Similarly, that government must have a rational reason for
22
its actions is first observed in an opinion written by Justice Stone, the
author of Carolene Products. In that case the Court agreed that California’s interest in protecting its public assistance funds was a rational
reason for its law requiring application of its workman’s compensa23
tion law for injured workers likely to domicile there. And though
24
Erie v. Tompkins is not thought of as a due process decision, Professor Weinberg demonstrates that it reflects thinking that was developing prior to Carolene Products, recognizing state interests as being important in establishing state legislative, or in the case of Erie, state
19
20
21
22
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304 U.S. 144 (1938).
Louise Weinberg, Unlikely Beginnings of Modern Constitutional Thought, 15 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 291, 293 (2012).
Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407–08 (1930).
Alaska Packers v. Indust. Acc. Comm’n of Calif., 294 U.S. 532, 543 (1935) (“As the state
had the power to impose the liability in pursuance of state policy, it was a rational, and
therefore a permissible, exercise of state power to prohibit any contract in evasion of it.”).
Id. at 549–50.
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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judicial authority, and is part of a clarifying movement focusing issues
of federalism, due process, and commerce on the governmental interests involved.
CONCLUSION
This symposium’s approach to the subject matter, and the topics
of the articles, faces the obvious “elephant in the room,” the health
care litigation, not by depicting it as a non-issue, but by treating it as
one of many issues in what can be described as an ideological impasse
on governance. That impasse developed from doctrinal trends during the New Deal, and has developed into an impasse perhaps over
the last generation. The topical treatments here emphasize a holistic
view of how the modern regulatory state came into being, how it has
been characterized, and how ideology has affected the articulation of
constitutional standards, both now and at the beginning of the debate in the late 1930s. Though it turned out not to be the bellwether
opinion many had hoped for, National Federation’s importance lies in
laying bare the tensions between two quite different views of the Constitution and national governance. This symposium hopefully will
provide a bit of context to the impasse displayed in the Supreme
Court’s opinion.

10

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:1

